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The global economy performed vigorously in the first 
few years of the new millennium, particularly between 
2003 and 2007; and the combination of high rates of 
economic growth with price stability fostered a belief 
that governments had dominated business cycles. 
Nonetheless, although this panorama reflects a period 
of great evolution in the world economy, the latter, and 
the United States economy in particular, began to show 
clear signs of financial fragility as from 2007. That year 
saw the start of a process of major destabilization of 
markets, particularly in the real-estate sector.
Disequilibria in the real-estate market, and asset 
markets generally, reflected both macroeconomic factors 
and features inherent to the financial market. In the United 
States, which served as the lightning rod of the global 
crisis, the high rate of “dissaving” —reflected in the 
exceptionally large deficits on the current account— and 
overly expansionary monetary policy provoked large-
scale financial leveraging, encouraged by deregulation 
of the banking sector, and the emergence of various 
financial innovations, including credit derivatives and 
uncontrolled securitization. 
This process intensified, and the leveraging of firms 
and families grew exponentially. In 2007, asymptotic 
borrowing reached its limit. At the first sign of financial 
fragility in the banks and excessive exposure among 
borrowers with insufficient payment capacity, creditors 
called for a replenishment of collateral margin and 
suspended debt refinancing. This triggered a bank run, 
with the potential to seriously impair the liquidity of the 
financial system, or even render it insolvent. In those 
circumstances, monetary and economic authorities 
around the world started to implement rescue and 
bailout operations, the aim of which, in principle, was 
not to mitigate the economic slowdown but to prevent 
financial collapse. 
The effects of the financial crisis quickly spread to 
the real side of the economy. Although capital markets 
(both equity and bank credit) served as the main crisis 
transmission channel deteriorating expectations also 
played an important role. The result was a sharp reduction 
in trade and capital flows worldwide; and investment 
decisions were put on hold, causing aggregate demand 
to freeze up.
The main repercussions on the Brazilian economy 
started to be felt in the second half of 2008, particularly 
in the last quarter; and they were manifested in the 
following way: (i) credit crunch both domestically and 
worldwide; (ii) wealth destruction caused by falling asset 
prices; (iii) worsening expectations; (iv) plummeting 
commodity prices; and (v) a reduction in world trade. 
Although somewhat late —because, as noted 
above, the effects of the global crisis initially became 
discernible in 2007— the Brazilian government authorities 
started to implement a series of measures to tackle the 
deterioration in the economic environment —both 
general (or horizontal) measures and sector-specific 
(vertical) measures.1 The aim was to mitigate the impact 
of the international crisis on Brazil, by avoiding a sharp 
slowdown in the economy and its negative consequences 
for output and employment.
In that framework, counter-cyclical fiscal, credit 
and monetary policies were adopted; and fiscal policy 
lowered the rate of industrial products tax (ipi) in specific 
sectors of the economy Credit policy was implemented 
mainly through banks and public financial institutions, 
which made up for the lack of private credit in several 
sectors of the economy, including civil construction 
and the automotive sector. Lastly, monetary policy 
implemented a substantial cut in the economy’s basic 
interest rate, which was reflected in both nominal and 
real rates, thereby demonstrating the predominance of 
the monetary dimension in the conduct of Brazilian 
economic policy.
This article does not discuss the origins of, or 
provide explanations for, the factors causing the crisis in 
the United States financial system and its repercussions 
on the world economy. Several authors have already 
addressed these issues, including Mohan (2009); Rose 
and Spiegel (2009); Taylor (2009); Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2009); Krugman (2009); Lopes (2009); Rogoff 
and Reinhart (2010); Roubini and Mihm (2010); Kacef 
and López-Monti (2010). The chronology of the crisis is 
also beyond the scope of this article, and can reviewed 
in Torres Filho (2008) and Torres Filho and Rodrigues 
 
 
1 As horizontal measures are macroeconomic they affect society as a 
whole. They include the reduction in the basic interest rate. Vertical 
measures are specific and affect certain productive sectors, such as 
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Borça Júnior (2008). The core of this analysis consists of 
an evaluation of the counter-cyclical measures adopted 
by the Brazilian government to mitigate the effects of 
the crisis. An analysis is made of the repercussions of 
monetary, fiscal and credit policies on some of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates, and in certain sectors of 
the economy which received government incentives. 
The article is structured as follows. Following this 
brief introduction, section II addresses a number of 
methodological issues, focusing on the databases; and it 
describes the main counter-cyclical measures adopted in 
Brazil. Section III constructs estimates of the effects of the 
counter-cyclical measures on aggregate demand and its 
components; and, lastly, section IV presents conclusions. 
II
methodological issues and counter-cyclical 
measures adopted in Brazil
The variables and respective nomenclatures (in 
parentheses) used in this article are as follows: Final 
consumption of families - (Consfam); Gross domestic 
product at basic prices (Y); Credit to the private sector - 
(Cred pri); Basic interest-rate (percentage) implemented 
through the Special Settlement and Custody System (selic) 
- (R); Gross fixed capital formation - (fbcf); Inflation 
rate as measured by the Extended National Consumer 
Price Index (ipca) - (π); Product taxes - (imp); and Real 
gross domestic product at market prices deflated by the 
general price index - domestic supply (igp-di) - (pib). 
Table A.1 in the appendix gives details of the variables 
used and specifies the sources and units of measurement.
The variables cited were modified to make them 
stationary and thus avoid spurious regressions. The 
variables final consumption of families, credit to the private 
sector and gross fixed capital formation (investment) 
were normalized with respect to gdp and basic prices. 
They were also transformed into rates of change and 
were renamed as d(Const  
fam / Yt), d(Credt 
pri / Yt) and 
d(fbcft / Yt), respectively.
2 
The real interest rate (ex post) was calculated as 
the difference between the selic rate and the ipca, and 
denoted as rt. The expected value of the ipca was not 
used, because that series was only available from 1999 
onwards when the inflation-targeting regime began. The 
real interest rate variable was also transformed into a 
rate of change and represented through d(rt).
The Hodrick-Prescott filter was used to calculate the 
output gap Hiatot
pib, defined as the difference between 
real and potential gdp (trend). A positive value indicates 
excess demand, whereas a negative value signifies idle 
2 Assuming (Const  
fam / Yt) = at, so d(Const  
fam / Yt) = (at -at-1) / at-1.
productive capacity. Other variables were also measured 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The real interest rate 
gap Hiatot
r was defined as the difference between the 
real interest rate and the trend. A positive (negative) value 
indicates a restrictive (expansionary) monetary policy. 
The gap in the tax/income ratio, denoted by 
(IMPt /Yt) , was defined as the difference between that 
variable and its trend. A positive value indicates a 
restrictive fiscal policy. The gap in credit to the private 
sector in relation to income (Credt 
pri/Yt) , presented 
as Hiatot
cred, was defined as the difference between 
(Credt 
pri/Yt) and its trend. A positive value indicates an 
expansionary credit policy. Sector variables also were 
transformed into gaps and were differentiated from their 
respective trends.




2 and (IPIt  / Pt)
2, for the purpose of 
verifying the existence of a non-linear relation between 
those variables and the dependent variable. Two dummy 
variables were also introduced. The dummy variable D1, 
spanning the first quarter of 1991 to the second quarter 
of 1994, distinguishes the period prior to the real plan 
—characterized by inflationary instability— from the 
ensuing period in which inflation was brought under 
control. The second dummy variable, D2, is used to 
determine the period of the subprime mortgage crisis 
which spans the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter 
of 2010.3 
The next subsection analyses the effectiveness 
of the counter-cyclical measures implemented by the 
government during the subprime mortgage crisis. For 
3 Dummy variable D1 takes the following values: January 1991 to 
February 1994 = 1, otherwise = 0. dummy variable D2, takes the 
value 1 in the period January 2007 to January 2010, otherwise = 0.
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that purpose, empirical tests were performed using the 
following procedures: (i) checks were made to verify 
whether the variables used in the econometric models are 
stationary, to avoid the presence of spurious regressions; 
(ii) once the stationarity of the series has been confirmed 
through unit root tests —augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests— ordinary least squares (ols) 
equations are estimated; (iii) the residuals are analysed 
using a correlogram, and errors are adjusted using the 
Jarque-Bera method with the aim of turning the stochastic 
term into a white noise process; and (iv) the results of the 
estimated equations are then interpreted in the light of 
the signs and significance of the estimated parameters.
Counter-cyclical measures in Brazil
Since the deepening of the global financial crisis, the 
federal government has adopted various measures to 
contain the effects of the international turbulence on 
the Brazilian economy. In September 2008, steps were 
taken to address the major imbalances on the financial 
market through actions such as dollar auctions held by 
the Central Bank of Brazil. In other words, large-scale 
capital flight caused a substantial depreciation, which 
was alleviated by central bank dollar sales. In addition, 
new credit lines were created, and financing limits 
were raised, in an attempt to guarantee the continuity 
of the country’s economic activity. Credit lines were 
also created for consumption, decrees were signed to 
guarantee the structure of the banking sector, and the 
rules for enforcing compulsory deposits were altered.
During the crisis, the Brazilian government 
adopted counter-cyclical economic policies that went 
beyond specific measures to alleviate the impact on 
specific sectors. Monetary and credit policy included 
a reduction in compulsory bank reserves, cuts in the 
basic annual interest rate calculated each day by the 
Special Settlement and Custody System (selic), and an 
increase in the supply of credit by public banks. Those 
measures aimed to alleviate the negative effects of the 
crisis on investment and consumption, through lower 
interest rates and easier credit. Fiscal policy included 
cuts in certain taxes and a lower primary surplus target. 
The aim of both fiscal and monetary policies was 
to change pessimistic expectations and reduce their 
negative effect on consumption and investment, and lastly 
to avert a greater deterioration in the level of output and 
higher unemployment. In this framework, it was hoped 
that in 2010 the policies would ensure the continuity of 
economic recovery and fully reverse the minor recession 
of 2009, as was subsequently confirmed.
The next subsection provides details of the most 
important counter-cyclical measures used to tackle the 
crisis and their chronology.4 The measures are listed 
according to their month of implementation. 
September 2008
(i) 19 September 2008: Four days after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, which was considered decisive 
in magnifying the crisis to global proportions, the 
Brazilian exchange rate depreciated by 5%. To contain 
the depreciation, or, following Dornbusch (1976), avoid 
exchange-rate overshooting, the Central Bank of Brazil 
auctioned US$500 million; 
(ii) 24 September 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
issued Circular No. 3.405 increasing from R$100 million 
(100 million reais) to R$300 million the amount that 
financial institutions are required to deduct from the 
calculation of additional reserve requirement on demand 
deposits, time deposits and saving deposits. It also 
postponed the collection of compulsory bank deposits 
on financial leasing operations; and the date for the entry 
into force of the 25% reserve ratio on deposits received 
was postponed from 16 January to 13 March 2009; 
October 2008
(iii) 1 October 2008: Banco do Brasil, S.A. 
announced credits amounting to R$5 million to finance 
the agriculture sector; 
(iv) 2 October 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
allowed banks to reduce compulsory reserve requirements 
by up to 40%, provided they purchased credit operations 
from other financial institutions. The aim, in this case, 
was to allow for the transfer of portfolios of banks facing 
liquidity problems; 
(v) 6 October 2008: The Office of the President of 
the Republic published Provisional Measure No. 442, 
granting the Central Bank of Brazil powers to purchase 
the portfolios of banks based in the country. In this 
case, the objective was to show bank customers that 
the government was determined to defend deposits and 
thus avoid bank runs; 
(vi) 8 October 2008: Given the sharp exchange 
rate depreciation of over 9%, the Central Bank of Brazil 
made dollar sales on the spot market; 
(vii) 9 October 2008: In the same week in which 
the provisional measure was published allowing the 
Central Bank of Brazil to buy portfolios from banks 
4 For further details on the measures adopted and an analysis of the 
most relevant ones, see Relatório das Contas do Governo, exercício 
de 2009 [Report on government accounts, fiscal year 2009], on the 
website of the Federal Audit Department (Tribunal de Contas da União).
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with liquidity problems, the National Monetary Council 
(cmn) issued regulations on this; 
(viii) 13 October 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
raised the limit on the deduction of bank compulsory 
reserves to increase liquidity in the economy;
(ix) 14 October 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
reduced from 45% to 42% the percentage collection of 
compulsory reserves and the compulsory special reserve 
on demand deposits; 
(x) 16 October 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
allowed asset sales between banks to increase cash 
liquidity;
(xi) 21 October 2008: Provisional Measure 
No. 443 was published, authorizing Banco do Brasil and 
the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal - 
cef) to set up subsidiaries and take shares in financial 
institutions based in Brazil; 
(xii) 22 October 2008: The Tax on Financial 
Operations (iof) was lowered to zero in exchange 
settlement operations associated with foreign investment 
inflows in Brazil, with the aim of stimulating capital 
inflows and, thus, reduce pressure on the foreign-
exchange market; 
(xiii) 27 October 2008: Banks that had paid 60 
monthly contributions to the Credit Guarantee Fund, 
could now reduce the respective amount from the 
compulsory demand deposit. The aim of this was to 
increase liquidity in the economy;
(xiv) 30 October 2008: The Federal Reserve System 
(the United States central bank) and the Central Bank of 
Brazil set up a financial swap facility for US$30 billion, 
maturing on 30 April 2009. The aim was to improve 
liquidity in the international financial system; 
(xv) 30 October 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
altered remuneration of the compulsory time deposit 
with the aim of increasing credit in the market;
November 2008
(xvi) 4 November 2008: The Central Bank of Brazil 
issued rules governing dollar auctions to finance exports. 
Given the aforementioned freezing of the international 
commercial credit market, the central bank took steps 
to provide a credit to exporters; 
(xvii) 6 November 2008: The federal government 
released credits for a total of US$6.9 billion for small and 
medium-sized enterprises and for the automotive sector;
(xviii) 11 November 2008: The Government of the 
State of São Paulo set up a credit line of R$4 billion 
for the automotive sector. On the same day, the cef 
increased the limit for loans to purchase construction 
materials from R$7,000 reais to R$25,000;
(xix) 12 November 2008: The cef released a credit 
line for private individuals amounting to R$2 billion, 
intended for the purchase of electrical appliances, 
electronic equipment, furniture and construction materials; 
(xx) 13 November 2008: As from 1 December 2008, 
the additional reserve requirement on time, demand, and 
saving deposits would be made through government 
bonds. This expanded the financing capacity of the 
public sector; 
(xxi) 14 November 2008: The Office of the 
President of the Republic published Provisional Measure 
No. 452 447, extending for 10 days the deadline for 
collecting the on industrial products tax (ipi), tax withheld 
at source and the social security contribution. The 
collection period for the Social Integration Programme 
and the Contribution to the Financing of the Social 
Security System (pis/cofins) were also extended by five 
days. The changing the tax collection date was expected 
to contribute R$21 million to enterprise cash flows; 
(xxii) 21 November 2008: A decree was published 
lowering the iof rate from 3.38% to 0.38%, for the 
financing of motorcycles, motor scooters, and mopeds; 
December 2008
(xxiii) 11 December 2008: Decree No. 6.687 
reduced the ipi rates on the sale of vehicles and trucks. 
This measure would be enforced from 15 December 
2008 to 31 March 2009;
(xxiv) 11 December 2008: Decree No. 6.691 
lowered the iof rate applicable to credit operations with 
private individuals;
(xxv) 15 December 2008: The Federal government, 
through Provisional Measure No. 451, announced the 
change in rates for personal income-tax (irpf); and
January 2009
(xxvi) 22 January 2009: Provisional Measure 
No. 453 was issued, constituting an additional source of 
funding for the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (bndes), amounting to R$100 billion, with 
the aim of increasing availability of long-term credit. 
Counter-cyclical measures continued to be 
implemented in 2009, including a reduction in the ipi 
rates applied to white-line electrical appliances. Capital 
goods and construction materials were also temporarily 
exempted from ipi. Other measures were adopted with 
respect to credit, including a reduction in the long-
term interest rate. In addition, the government adopted 
a combination of investment and income-generating 
policies. The first included the creation of the Accelerated 
Growth Programme (pac II), while in the social area it 
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is important to mention the civil construction policy, 
represented by the Minha Casa Minha Vida [My home, 
my life] programme, and the extra resources made 
available to the population by increasing the amount of 
the subsidy paid by the Bolsa Familia programme and 
raising the minimum wage. 
Although the details of measures to combat the crisis 
and their respective chronology may seem mundane, 
the aim of this article is to analyse the counter-cyclical 
measures and their effectiveness in reducing the adverse 
effects of the international crisis. For that reason, the long 
list presented above is considered relevant for visualizing 
the path taken by the government in that endeavour. 
In brief, the policies applied by the government 
were implemented in various areas. Firstly, the aim 
was to maintain the external sector by extending credit 
to exporters, since traditional credit lines were frozen. 
With regard to the financial system, measures were 
taken to maintain the liquidity insolvency of the banks, 
while signalling to the markets the government’s serious 
intention to prevent a potential bank run. In terms 
of reviving the economy, an expansionary monetary 
policy was implemented through cuts in basic interest 
rates and a major credit expansion. Fiscal policy also 
had expansionary effects by granting a number of tax 
exemptions.
III 
The effectiveness of counter-cyclical measures 
in Brazil: aggregate analysis
This section discusses one of the fundamental aspects 
of this research: the effectiveness of the counter-cyclical 
policies implemented by the Brazilian authorities in late 
2008 and early 2009. To this end, a review is made of 
economic policy measures, to establish which in fact 
proved appropriate in combating the economic slowdown 
and rise in unemployment, and avoiding the effects of 
the deepening international crisis in Brazil. An analysis 
is then made of aggregate economic policy measures 
aimed at producing effects on the economy as a whole. 
After that, empirical evidence is presented on the 
effects of the counter-cyclical policies in the Brazilian 
economy —in particular, the effects of fiscal, monetary 
and credit policies on the family consumption, aggregate 
investment, and the output gap.
1.  Counter-cyclical effects of monetary and 
credit policies on family consumption
The following paragraphs evaluate the repercussions of 
credit extended to the private sector on aggregate family 
consumption. This analysis is based on the Keynesian 
consumption function, which is extended to incorporate 
the credit variable, such that:
 Const  
fam = β0 + β1Yt + β2Credt pri (1)
Normalizing equation (1) with respect to aggregate 
income, gives the following function: 
 Const  
fam / Yt= β0 + β1Credt  pri / Yt (2)
A positive sign is expected for the β1 credit 
coefficient. In other words, given an increase in the ratio 
between the volume of lending to the private sector and 
aggregate income, family consumption is expected to 
increase as a proportion of the same aggregate income. 
To eliminate the possibility of spurious regression, 
the variables defined in equation (2) were expressed 
as rates of change. Table A.2 in the appendix shows 
that the family consumption and private sector credit 
variables —both in relation to income— are stationary, 
so the unit root hypotheses is rejected. Equation (2) 
can then be rewritten in stochastic form. In addition, 
two variables are added, an interactive variable and the 
dummy variable D1.
  
 d(Const  
fam / Yt) = β0 + β1* d(Credt  pri / Yt) + (3)
 β2* d(Credt  pri / Yt)*D2 + β3*D1 + ut 
The variable D1 is used to capture effects prior to 
the real plan, which, as has been noted, correspond to a 
period of uncontrolled inflation. In contrast, the interactive 
variable d(Credt 
pri  /  Yt)
*D2, is used to evaluate the 
effects of the change in the credit/income ratio since the 
subprime mortgage crisis, in other words from the first 
quarter of 2007 until the first quarter of 2010 (dummy 
D2), on the dependent variable d(Const  
fam / Yt).
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The estimated parameter βˆ1 will indicate the 
effect of the explanatory variable d(Credt 
pri / Yt) on the 
dependent variable d(Const  
fam / Yt) throughout the period. 
Moreover, the sum of the estimated parameters βˆ1 and βˆ2 will represent the effect of the variable d(Credt  pri / 
Yt) on the variable d(Const  
fam / Yt) in the period between 
January 2007 and January 2010. The sum of the estimated 
parameters (βˆ1 + βˆ2) will reveal the effect of the variable 
of interest —in this case the joint effect of the variables 
d(Credt  
pri / Yt) and d(Credt  
pri / Yt)
*D2— on the dependent 
variable d(Const  
fam / Yt) during the crisis period. In this 
way, the repercussions of the counter-cyclical policies 
implemented by the government during the financial 
crisis can be evaluated. This procedure will also be 
applied to the other estimations. 
The results shown in table 1 represent the estimation 
of equation (3), which is basically used to analyse how 
credit, in its various versions, affected family consumption. 
It can firstly be seen that all of the estimated parameters 
are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, 
except for the parameter representing the intercept (βˆ0).
According to the statistics shown in table 1, a 10% 
increase in the credit variable, specifically through 
d(Cred 
pri / Y ), is associated with an increase of about 
6.1% in family consumption, d(Const  
fam / Yt), In other 
words, credit really does have an effect on aggregate 
demand through consumption in the period analysed.
The sum of the estimated parameters βˆ1 and βˆ2 
is 0.095, which means that a 10% increase in credit, 
d(Cred 
pri / Y ) , elicits an increase of about 1% in family 
consumption, d(Const  
fam / Yt) in the crisis period. This 
shows that the counter-cyclical credit policy implemented 
by the government to combat the negative effects of 
the external imbalances had a positive effect on family 
consumption. 
As expected, the dummy variable D1 had a negative 
effect on the family consumption variable, which suggests 
that the price instability period prior to the real plan 
reduced family purchasing power and, consequently, 
had a negative effect on families’ final consumption. 
Looking beyond the effects of the 2008 and 2009 
financial crisis, the result of the dummy variable D1 is 
quite interesting, since it clearly shows that the loss of 
control over prices acted as an inflation tax on society, 
with a negative effect on final consumption.5 
Continuing the analysis of the effects of the counter-
cyclical monetary and credit policies, equation (3) was 
modified to incorporate the real interest rate, as shown 
in equation (4) 
 d(Const  
fam / Yt) = β0 + β1* d(Credt pri / Yt) + 
 β2* d(Credt pri / Yt)*D2 + β3*d(rt-1) + (4)
  β4*d(rt-1)*D2 + ut
5 The regression was adjusted on the basis of an autoregressive moving 
average (arma) model, so that the residuals were turned into a white 
noise process. The estimated coefficients of AR(1), AR(3), MA(2), 
MA(3) and MA(4) are statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
aims to reaffirm the validity of the regression. The correlogram of the 
residuals was verified and revealed a white noise process.
TABLE 1
Estimation of equation (3): Effect of credit on family consumption 
(January 1991-January 2010)
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation Student t-statistic P-statistic 
Intercept <0.001 0.004 0.275 0.784
d(Cred pri / Y) 0.608 0.049 12.272 <0.001
d(Cred pri / Y)*D2 -0.513 0.181 -2.839 0.006
D1 -0.023 0.010 -2.261 0.027
AR(1) -0.333 0.087 -3.820 <0.001
AR(3) -0.644 0.089 -7.215 <0.001
MA(2) -0.226 0.094 -2.417 0.018
MA(3) 0.726 0.086 8.416 <0.001
MA(4) 0.428 0.077 5.540 <0.001
R2 0.787 F-statistic 29.648
Durbin-Watson (dw) 1.903 P-statistic
(F-statistic)
<0.001
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: Equation estimated by ordinary least squares (ols).
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To simplify, throughout this article variables 
expressed as rates (such as the rate of change of the 
credit/ income ratio, and the rate of change of the real 
interest rate) are referred to as credit and real interest 
rate. The results of the estimation of equation (4) are 
shown in table 2.
The statistics set out in table 2 show that the estimated 
parameters βˆ1 and βˆ3 are statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level. Moreover, the parameter βˆ2 is 
marginally significant at the 10% significance level. 
These results suggest that a 10% increase in the credit 
variable is associated with an increase of around 3.5% 
in family’s final consumption, the sum of the estimated 
parameters βˆ1 and βˆ2 is 0.155, which means that a 10% 
increase in credit produces a 1.5% increase in family 
consumption during the crisis period. 
The estimated parameters strengthen the hypothesis 
that the credit policy implemented to mitigate the effects 
of the global crisis in Brazil was effective, because it 
had a positive effect on family consumption. These 
estimations corroborate those shown in table 1.6 
It can also be seen that a 1% reduction in the variable 
d(rt-1), representing the real interest rate, involves an 
increase of 0.005% in final family consumption during 
the period analysed. The estimated coefficient of the 
interactive variable d(rt-1)
*D2 is statistically zero at 
-0.005, which implies that the change in the real interest 
rate during the crisis period did not affect the change 
6 The inclusion of the real interest rate resulted in a loss of significance 
for the dummy variable D1, which refers to the pre-real plan inflationary 
period, and consequently was rejected from the model.
in family consumption. An explanation for that result 
could be that, when purchasing durable consumer goods, 
consumers use the financing term as a control variable 
rather than the interest rate,7 to ensure that installments 
are compatible with the availability of income.8 
2. Counter-cyclical effects of monetary 
and credit policies on gross fixed capital 
formation (investments)
This subsection evaluates the repercussions of the real 
interest rate and lending to the private sector on gross 
fixed capital formation (fbcf). The analysis was based on 
the Keynesian investment function,9 which is expanded 
to incorporate the credit variable.
 FBCFt = β0 + β1*Yt + β2*rt + β3*Credt  pri (5)
Normalizing equation (5) through aggregate income 
gives the following function:
 FBCFt / Yt = β0 + β1*rt + β2*(Credt  pri / Yt)  (6)
7 The basic issue for the consumer would not be the interest charges 
paid but adapting the loan to his or her budget.
8 In this case, the regression was also adjusted on the basis of a arma 
process, so that the residuals became white noise. The estimated 
parameters AR(1), AR(4) and MA(2) are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Lastly, the correlogram of the residuals verified the 
white noise process.
9 A complete version of the Keynesian investment function would 
require the inclusion of a variable representing business expectations. 
TABLE 2
Estimation of equation (4): Effect of credit  
and the real interest rate on family consumption
(January 1991-January 2010)
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation Student t-statistic P-statistic 
Intercept -0.0005 0.002 -0.222 0.824
d(Cred pri / Y) 0.355 0.066 5.397 <0.001
d(Cred pri / Y)*D2 -0.200 0.117 -1.709 0.087
d(rt-1) -0.005 0.002 -2.089 0.037
d(rt-1)
*D2 0.006 0.007 0.861 0.389
AR(1) -0.339 0.076 -4.444 <0.001
AR(4) 0.605 0.068 8.819 <0.001
MA(2) -0.353 0.100 -3.517 <0.001
R2 0.710 F-statistic 14.689
Durbin-Watson (dw) 2.103 P-statistic 
(F-statistic)
<0.001
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: Equation estimated by ordinary least squares (ols). 
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The coefficients βˆ1 and βˆ2 are expected to be negative 
and positive, respectively. In other words, a reduction in 
real interest rates is expected to stimulate investment, 
which would also receive incentives as a result of the 
credit expansion. Transforming the variables into rates 
of change gives the equation (7).10
 d(FBCFt / Yt) = β0 + β1*d(rt) + β2*d(Credtpri / Yt) (7)
 + β3*d(Credt pri / Yt)*D2 + β4*d(rt)*D2 + ut
The results for equation (7) are set out in table 3 
and show that the estimated parameters βˆ0, βˆ2, βˆ3 and βˆ4 are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. These results are revealing, since they show that 
the change in the real interest rate did not have effects 
on the variation of fbcf (investment) in the analysis 
covering the whole period. This may suggest two 
consequences: (i) the key factor in the level of investment 
is entrepreneurial expectations; and (ii) the interest rate 
which in fact is used to finance a substantial part of 
private sector investment, is not the economy’s basic 
interest rate or the selic.11 
Another interesting result concerns the statistically 
zero effect of changes in credit policy during the crisis 
period. Here again, this result could be related to the 
pessimistic climate among the business community. 
Thus, negative expectations for the future of the economy 
10 The aim of this is to eliminate risks of spurious regression. The 
stationarity of the variables can be seen in table A.2 of the appendix.
11  The relevant rates would be those of the bndes and other government 
lending institutions.
would make credit policy less effective in stimulating 
new investments during the crisis period. In the climate 
of pessimism caused by the world recession and, to a 
lesser extent the domestic one, entrepreneurs opted to 
postpone investments. 
On the other hand, the coefficient βˆ1 is statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level, so credit can be 
seen as a decisive factor for investments. This estimation 
can be interpreted as follows: a 10% increase in credit 
generates an increase in investment of about 4% over 
the whole period. As that parameter was not altered in 
response to an expansionary credit policy in the crisis 
period, βˆ1 + βˆ2 = 0.434 + 0 = 0.434.12
3.  Counter-cyclical effects of fiscal policy  
on output
Having evaluated the effects of credit operations and 
the real interest rate on family consumption and fbcf 
(investments), the analysis is now extended to measure 
not only the effects of monetary and credit policy on 
output, but also those of fiscal policy. The estimated 
equation is shown below.
 Hiatot
pib = β0 + β1*Hiatort-1 + β2*Hiatort-1*D2  
 + β3*Hiatot-1
imp / Y + β4*Hiatot-1
imp /  Y  *D2 + (8)
 β5*Hiatot-1
cred / P + β6*Hiatot-1
cred / P*D2 + β7*(IMP/Y)2 + ut 
  
12 The estimated regression was adjusted on the basis of a MA(24) 
process, so that the residuals displayed a white noise process. The 
validity of the estimated regression was thus guaranteed. 
TABLE 3
Estimation of equation (7): Effect of credit  
and the real interest rate on gross fixed capital formation
(January 1991-January 2010)
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation Student t-statistic P-statistic 
Intercept 0.004 0.007 0.530 0.598
d(Cred pri / Y) 0.434 0.188 2.313 0.024
d(Cred pri / Y)*D2 -0.487 0.308 -1.582 0.118
d(r) -0.0007 0.003 -0.190 0.849
d(r)*D2 -0.0002 0.014 -0.011 0.991
MA(24) 0.911 0.035 26.188 <0.001
R2 0.724 F-statistic 36.789
Durbin-Watson (dw) 1.971 P-statistic 
(F- statistic)
<0.001
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: Equation estimated by ordinary least squares (ols). gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
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Basically, equation (8) shows that the output 
gap, in other words the difference between actual and 
potential output, is affected by gaps in the interest rate 
and credit operations (divergence of variable from its 
trend) —and the tax gap. Estimations of equation (8) 
are shown in table 4. 
The results set out in table 4 show that the 
estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level except for the parameters βˆ0, βˆ3, βˆ4 and βˆ7. It can be seen that taxes, in their various 
specifications, did not significantly affect the output 
gap and therefore did not help mitigate the effects of 
the 2008-2009 global crisis. The estimated coefficient 
of the square of the tax/gdp ratio is also not statistically 
significant, thereby suggesting the nonexistence of a 
non-linear relation between the taxes/gdp ratio and the 
output gap.
The interest-rate coefficient has the expected 
negative sign, such that a 10% reduction in the lagged 
interest-rate variable in involves a 0.05% increase in 
the output gap. Another conclusion can be drawn from 
the fact that that result is identical to the ratio between 
the variation in the real interest rate and the variation 
in family consumption. Although the coefficient βˆ1 is 
statistically different from zero, it is nonetheless very 
small, which reveals the low elasticity of the output gap 
with respect to changes in interest rates.
During the crisis period there was a larger negative 
effect of the real interest rate gap on the output gap. The 
sum of the estimated parameters βˆ1 and βˆ2 produces a 
negative result of -0.05, which means that 10% reduction 
in the interest-rate in the crisis period involves a 5% 
improvement in the output gap —so expansionary 
monetary policy had a significant effect on the recovery 
process in the Brazilian economy. Comparing the normal 
period with the crisis period, it can be seen that the 
power of the interest rate effect increased by 1,000%, 
specifically in the crisis period. 
The tax gap in relation to income is marginally 
significant at the 10% level. In this case, it can be 
concluded that a 10% reduction in the lagged tax 
variable involves an increase of about 3% in the 
output gap. The interactive variable Hiatot-1
imp /  Y  *D2 is 
not statistically significant, however, which shows 
that counter-cyclical fiscal policy was not statistically 
significant in explaining the recovery of the Brazilian 
economy during the crisis period.
In relation to credit policy, the model estimated from 
equation (8) produced significant coefficients. Specifically, 
the estimated coefficients for credit —both covering 
the whole period analysed and the period subsequent 
to the sub prime mortgage crisis— statistically affect 
the output gap. Nonetheless, the values are close to 0, 
which suggests that credit, in the specification given by 
TABLE 4
Estimation of equation (8): Effects of the interest rate gap,  
credit operations and tax gap on the output gap
(January 1991-January 2010)
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation Student t-statistic P-statistic 
Intercept 0.093 0.064 1.462 0.149
Hiatort-1 -0.005 0.003 -2.009 0.049
Hiatort-1
*D2 -0.045 0.017 -2.547 0.013
Hiatot-1
imp /  Y -0.305 0.169 -1.804 0.076
Hiatot-1
imp /  Y  *D2 -0.289 0.372 -0.777 0.440
Hiatot-1
cred / P 2.48E-07 8.78E-08 2.828 0.006
Hiatot-1
cred / P*D2 -2.19E-07 1.09E-07 -2.007 0.049
(IMPt  /  Yt)
2 -3.103961 2.206929 -1.406 0.164
AR(4) 0.410 0.112 3.656 <0.001
R2 0.542 F-statistic 9.314
dw 1.511 P-statistic 
(F- statistic)
<0.001
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: Equation estimated by ordinary least squares (ols).
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equation (8), apparently had little effect on the output 
gap. Similarly, the sum of the parameters βˆ5 and βˆ6 
produced a significant statistic with the expected sign 
(positive), but a value close to 0. Nonetheless, as the 
values of the credit variable are expressed in billions 
of reais, the repercussion of a very small value, but 
statistically different from 0, on a very large value, is not 
negligible. Consequently, based on the model specified 
by equation (8), it can be stated that credit produced a 
considerable effect on the output gap.13
13 Here again the regression was adjusted. An AR(4) was estimated, 
which was statistically significant at the 1% level. The residuals of the 
adjusted regression thus displayed a white noise process.
Accordingly, based on the results summarized in 
table 5, it can be inferred that: (i) family consumption 
responded positively to the expansionary credit policy; 
(ii) fbcf (investment) was not sensitive to expansionary 
monetary and credit policies; and (iii) output was sensitive 
to the expansionary monetary policy implemented through 
a cut in real interest rates and it responded positively to 
the credit expansion. Lastly, the expansionary fiscal policy 
(which involved tax cuts) did not have the effect on output. 
This is corroborated by evaluating the government’s 
intertemporal constraint. Basically, forgoing revenue 
or increasing current expenditure should be offset in 
the near future with restrictive measures that ensure the 
solvency of the public accounts.
TABLE 5
Summary of the results of counter-cyclical policies
Dependent variable Monetary policy Credit policy Fiscal policy
Family consumption Ineffective Effective Not evaluated
Investment Ineffective Ineffective Not evaluated
Output Effective Effective Ineffective
Source: Prepared by the authors.
IV
Conclusions
The empirical analysis showed that the expansionary 
credit policy played a key role in boosting family 
consumption and aggregate output during the crisis. 
Expansionary monetary policy was also important in 
increasing aggregate output in the same period. In contrast, 
investment expenditure did not prove sensitive to the 
counter-cyclical monetary, credit and fiscal policies. This 
result can be explained by the high level of uncertainty and 
negative expectations regarding the future of the economy, 
which were possibly decisive for entrepreneurs to adopt a 
more cautious and conservative stance, suspending a large 
proportion of ongoing investments and cancelling new 
projects. Thus, from the aggregate-demand standpoint, 
monetary and credit policies played an important role in 
the recovery of the Brazilian economy, whereas, fiscal 
policy proved ineffective in reviving business activity 
in the country.
It is worth drawing attention to number of points 
relating to the cost-benefit ratio of the counter-cyclical 
policies implemented. The empirical results broadly show 
that, unlike monetary and credit policies, fiscal policy 
was not a key player in the recovery of economic activity. 
Apart from possibly providing a minimum benefit, fiscal 
policy involved a high cost in the form of additional 
public debt resulting from a larger nominal fiscal deficit. 
It will be worth studying the consequences of the use 
of expansionary fiscal policies in future research, since 
the empirical analysis shows that short-term benefit 
was minimal, while the cost, even in the short run, was 
not negligible. Taking a long-term view, the increase in 
expenditure, particularly permanent expenses (wages 
and social security, among others), and the reduction 
in revenue, will require additional measures to restore 
the fiscal adjustment, and this could reduce resources 
available for private investment.
(Original: Portuguese)
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APPENDIX
TABLE A.1
Description of aggregate variables
Variable Acronym Unit of measurement Source
Final family consumption Cons fam R$ million ipea
gdp at basic prices Y R$ million ipea
Basic interest rate implemented through the Special 
Settlement and Custody System (selic) 
R Percentages ipea
Gross fixed capital formation fbcf R$ million ipea
gdp at market prices deflated by the general price index - 
domestic supply (igp-di). 
pib R$ million ipea
Inflation rate as measured by the Extended National 
Consumer Price Index (ipca) 
π Percentages ipea
Lending to the private sector Cred pri R$ million ipea
Product taxes imp Chained index (ave. 1995 = 100) ipea
Source: Prepared by the authors. 


























(imp / Y)2 -3.471** -2.861 0.181 -3.470** -4.614 0.002
d(r) -1.946* -6.563 <0.001 -1.945* -9.206 <0.001
d(fbcf / Y) -1.945* -8.511 <0.001 -1.945* -10.754 <0.001
d(Const  
fam / Yt) -1.946* -4.945 <0.001 -1.945* -29.860 <0.001
d(Credt 
pri / Yt) -1.945* -8.115 <0.001 -1.945* -8.143 <0.001
Hiatocred -1.945* -3.203 0.002 -1.945* -2.636 0.009
Hiatopib -1.946* -2.196 0.028 -1.945* -5.728 <0.001
Hiatoimp / Y -1.945* -4.647 <0.001 -1.945* -4.712 <0.001
Hiator -1.945* -8.743 <0.001 -1.945* -10.310 <0.001
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Notes: (i) H0: displays a unit root; (ii) One asterisk (*) represents test with constant; and two asterisks (**) represents a test with a constant 
and trend; (iii) dxt = (xt – xt-1) / xt-1 = (Δxt / xt-1).
sic: Schwartz information criterion. 
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